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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the design and evaluation of Southampton-
SCM, the runner-up in the 2005 International Trading Agent Sup-
ply Chain Management Competition (TAC SCM). In particular, we
focus on the way in which our agent purchases components using a
mixed procurement strategy (combining long and short term plan-
ning) and how it sets its prices according to the prevailing market
situation and its own inventory level (because this adaptivity and
ﬂexibility are key to its success). We analyse our buying and selling
strategies in the actual competition and in controlled experiments.
Through this evaluation, we show that SouthamptonSCM performs
well across a broad range of environments.
1. INTRODUCTION
Effective supply chain management is vital to today’s economy and
increasingly organisations are looking to the agility and automation
afforded by agent-based approaches [4]. To this end, the Interna-
tional Trading Agents Competition for Supply Chain Management
(http://www.sics.se/tac) (TAC SCM) provides a benchmark-
ing environment for testing and evaluating agents in a challenging
and realistic setting. Speciﬁcally, in the TAC SCM scenario, the
aim is to design an agent representing a computer manufacturer,
that competes with other agents for computer components (from
the supplier side) and computer orders (from the customer side).
These agents are also responsible for managing their limited pro-
duction capacities, in order to deliver the products to customers
before the due date they agreed in the order.
In more detail, a game includes six agents (competition entrants)
that compete with one another to procure raw components and ful-
ﬁl customer orders for assembled PCs. Each agent can produce 16
distinct computer types from four components: CPU, motherboard,
memory and hard disk (e.g. a PC with a 2GHz IMD processor with
1GB memory and a 300GB hard drive). Consequently, on each of
the 220 simulation days of the game, agents receive new request for
quotes (RFQs) and actual orders (if offers they have previously sent
win) from the customers. From the supplier side, an agent receives
offers to deliver particular quantities and types of components at
particular prices in response to the RFQs that it sent on the previ-
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ous day. Thus, in each day of the game (lasting 15 seconds), the
agent must decide on the following: (i) which new supplier RFQs
to send and which supplier’s offers to accept; (ii) which customer
RFQs to respond to, and at what price; and (iii) how to schedule the
production of PCs given the availability of components, the limited
capacityofthefactoryandthedeliverydeadlinesofpendingorders.
Now, an agent spends money on buying the components, paying for
the storage of both components and PCs, paying penalties if it de-
faults on a promised delivery date and paying overdraft penalties
if it is in debt to the bank. The agent earns money by selling PCs
and receives interest from the bank if its balance is positive. The
success of an agent is measured in terms of its proﬁt (i.e., its bank
balance at the end of the game).
Against this background, we present the design and evaluation of
our agent (SouthamptonSCM) that was the runner-up in the 2005
competition (out of 32 initial participants). The main contributions
of this work are as follows. First, we develop techniques to enable
the agent to adapt its price setting to the prevailing market situa-
tion, its own internal state (inventory level) and the time that has
elapsed. At their core, these techniques employ fuzzy reasoning
in order to allow the agent to adapt its prices daily so that it can
fully exploit its production capacity, while still maximising its rev-
enue by selling at appropriate prices. Second, we develop a mixed
procurement strategy that enables the agent to buy components ac-
cording to what is needed in the near future (by predicting customer
demand) and also to order a small quantity of components far in
advance (at a lower price) to meet the minimum daily usage. This
strategy balances ﬂexibility in dealing with the dynamically chang-
ing market, with the need to procure components at low cost whilst
also minimising inventory stock. This is especially useful when
the demand is increasing and the agents are thus competing for the
components, since it is this case that causes component prices to
increase. To evaluate the effectiveness of these developments, we
analyse the performance of our agent in the actual competition and
also in more systematic controlled experiments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents our agent. In section 3 we evaluate it. Finally, in section 4
we conclude and discuss future work.
2. SouthamptonSCM
SouthamptonSCM is composed of three sub-agents (see ﬁgure 1).1
The customer agent receives RFQs from the customers and decides
what offers to respond with. It also communicates with the fac-
tory agent to obtain the updated inventory levels and to send the
1Hereweusethenotionofsub-agents(insteadofmodules)because
each of them can autonomously communicate with the suppliers
and customers to get the RFQs, can send offers and obtain orders,
and can decide how to respond to this information.-
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Figure 2: Overview of the component agent.
R2: if D is medium and I is high then r2 is very-medium
R3: if D is low and I is high then r3 is small
In these rules, the customer demand (D) is expressed in the fuzzy
linguistic terms high, medium, and low, and the inventory level (I)
in the terms high, medium, and low. The output of each rule is a
fuzzy variable (r1 to r3 in these examples), and thus, the outputs
of all the rules are combined by the Sugeno controller to give a
single scalar result, r, that represents the price adjustment factor
used to generate a reference price [2] for each type of PC. When
r is high, the reference price approaches (or is even higher than)
the highest transaction price recorded on the previous day (this in-
formation is made available to the agents through the daily market
report), whilst when r is low, the reference price approaches the
lowest transaction price. Given the reference price of each type of
PC, an offer price is calculated by modifying the reference price by
a factor related to the requested due date. The intuition here is that
the sooner the due date, the higher the offered price. Thus, rule R1
captures the fact that if the customer demand for this kind of PC is
high and the agent has a low inventory in stock, then the offer price
should be very high since here there is an opportunity to maximise
the agent’s proﬁt.
The second rule base is employed for the days near the end of
the game (last 20 in this case) and it considers the current inventory
level, the customer demand and also how close it is to the end of the
game. There are 22 such rules that capture different combinations
of situations of these three variables, and, three such rules in this
rule base, are:
R
0
1: if D is high and I is high and E is far then r
0
1 is big
R
0
2: if D is high and I is high and E is medium then r
0
2 is medium
R
0
3: if D is low and I is high and E is close then r
0
3 is very-small
Here, the days to the end of the game (E) are expressed in the fuzzy
linguistic terms: far, medium, and close. Thus, for example, rule
R
0
3 captures the fact that if there is little demand for a particular
type of PC, the agent has a high inventory, and there is a little time
until the end of the game, then the price adjustment factor should
be very small (thus ensuring a low offer price and hence reducing
the risk of being left with inventory at the end of the game).
2.2 The Component Agent
The component agent is responsible for dealing with the compo-
nent suppliers and aims to ensure that there are always sufﬁcient
components in stock to address the customers’ changing demand
for ﬁnished products. In doing so, it addresses a challenge that
is common to all supply chains facing dynamically changing cus-
tomer demand. That is, it must procure components at a low cost,
whilst simultaneously maintaining a minimal component inventory
in order to reduce the daily storage cost and also the possibility of
being left with redundant stock if customer demand changes.
Now, the2005componentagentusesacompletelydifferentstrat-
egy to that of last year. In 2004, it procured most of its components
by placing a large order on day 0 (due to the fact that the suppli-
ers have their full capacity available on day 0 and thus offer the
lowest possible price [3]). However, in 2005, the game rules were
changed in order to reduce the lottery effect in the supplier inter-
actions, to discourage the use of a day 0 procurement strategy [7],
and to deter agents from requesting large quantities of components
without intending to order them [1]. This means that the compo-
nent agent used in 2004 is no longer effective, and thus, we present
our updated component agent here.
Inaddressingtheprocurementchallengethisyear, theagentfaces
a common dilemma concerning the lead time of component orders.
More speciﬁcally, ordering components with a long lead time (i.e.
for delivery a long time into the future) generally leads to low pro-
curement costs (since the suppliers have adequate spare capacity
over this long period). However, the agent is then exposed to the
risk that the customer demand may change, leaving it with exces-
sive component stock. Conversely, ordering components with a
short lead time allows the agent to effectively track the changing
customer demand and maintain minimum stock inventory. How-
ever, due to the short lead time, the suppliers generally have less
ﬂexibility in scheduling the production of these orders (since the
order is competing with those from other agents for the limited pro-
duction capacity available), and thus, procurement costs are high.
Now, totacklethisdilemma, SouthamptonSCMemploysamixed
procurement strategy; dividing the remaining days of the game into
two classes: near future and far future (see ﬁgure 2). For the days
in the far future, the agent periodically orders a small ﬁxed quantity
of components, so as to ensure that a minimum quantity of stock is
available in order to keep the factory running (see section 2.2.1 for
details). For the days in the near future (which is 35 days in this
case4), the agent makes a short term prediction of the future cus-
tomer demand, and orders sufﬁcient components to address this de-
mand (see section 2.2.2 for details). In addition, within this near fu-
ture, the agent also tests the market in order to track current prices.
This price information is used to choose the appropriate lead time
and reserve price of the RFQ sent to the suppliers. In more detail,
since each agent can send a maximum of ﬁve RFQs for a particu-
lar component to each supplier each day, the agent uses four RFQs
for the near future procurement (i.e. to actually order components
with short lead time and also to track the component prices). The
remaining RFQ is used to buy components for the far future.
2.2.1 Far Future Procurement
Of the two strategies, the far future procurement one is the simpler.
Forthis, theagentassumesthatinthefarfuture, therewillbeadaily
minimum need for 30 CPU and 60 other components (this ratio is
required since there are four different types of CPU, but other com-
ponents are only available in two different types), and thus checks
whether there is sufﬁcient current and pending component inven-
tory to meet this need. If not, it submits an RFQ for a ﬁxed amount
to the relevant supplier, requesting delivery on the date at which
the predicted inventory falls below the daily minimum need (up to
a maximum of 120 days into the future).
2.2.2 Near Future Procurement
The near future procurement strategy is more complex. It con-
4In our experimental evaluation, we found that a larger number
than 35 led to signiﬁcantly more redundant components in stock
due to the difﬁculty of predicting the ﬂuctuating customer demand,
whilst a smaller amount was not able to keep the stock above a
minimum usable threshold.0 40 80 120 160 200
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Figure 4: Cumulative order quantities in game tac4-4253.
2.3 The Factory Agent
One of the main challenges for the factory agent is scheduling what
to produce and when to produce it (i.e., how to allocate supply re-
sources and factory time). The strategy we use for Southampton-
SCM 2005 agent is broadly similar with that of last year’s agent.
This strategy involves manufacturing PCs according to customer
orders and satisfying orders with an earlier delivery date (see [3]
for more detail). Now, since the computers stored in the factory
will be charged storage cost, each order will be delivered as soon
as it is ﬁlled. The agent builds the PCs according to the customers’
orders it has obtained (which has the advantage of ensuring that
the factory always produces the needed computers on time). How-
ever, if on any day, there are still free factory assembling cycles
available, and the numbers of ﬁnished PCs in stock are below a
certain threshold, then the agent produces additional PCs of each
kind uniformly (subject to the availability of components) in order
to maximise the factory utilisation. It is critical that this threshold
is set appropriately; a high threshold will lead to excessive ﬁnished
PC inventory, which may be hard to sell if demand is low. In 2005,
this threshold is set to 80, and this is shown to work well in both
low and high demand markets.
3. EVALUATION
Our evaluation is composed of three components: (i) the results
from the 2005 competition; (ii) our post-hoc analysis of some typi-
cal games in the actual competition; and (iii) a systematic range of
controlled experiments.
3.1 Competition Results
TAC SCM consists of a preliminary round (predominantly used for
practice and ﬁne tuning) followed by a seeding round that deter-
mines the groupings for the ﬁnal rounds. The top 24 agents from
the seeding round are organised into 4 groups that represent each of
the four quarter-ﬁnals. The top three teams of quarter-ﬁnals 1 and
3 are entered into semi-ﬁnal 1, and similarly, the ﬁrst 3 teams from
quarter-ﬁnals 2 and 4 are entered into semi-ﬁnal 2. Finally, the ﬁrst
3 teams in both semi-ﬁnals are entered into the ﬁnal round.
In the 2005 competition, there were 32 entries and Southampton-
SCM was placed seventh among all the participants in the seeding
are placed. Agents with higher reputation are given priority treat-
ment and receive lower offer prices. Thus SouthamptonSCM main-
tains a perfect reputation record by adopting the policy of accepting
all offers that it receives (this is dealt with by the Offer Processing
in ﬁgure 2). Thus, it is essential that the agent sets the reserve price
of RFQs to an appropriate value, to avoid being obliged to accept
an excessively expensive offer.
round and entered group B for the quarter-ﬁnal. Here, it had the
second highest score, in its semi-ﬁnal it had the highest score, and
in the ﬁnal, it was the runner-up (to TacTex-05 [5]).7
3.2 Competition Game Analysis
In this section, we analyse the performance of SouthamptonSCM
in terms of the efﬁciency of both its buying and selling strategies.
Thatis, weconsidertheeffectivenessofthecustomerpricingmodel
and the mixed component procurement strategy. Thus we select a
particular game from the ﬁnal (game tac4-4253) and analyse it in
more detail.8
3.2.1 Analysing the Selling Strategy
To complement and better understand the competition result and to
evaluate the effectiveness of our pricing model (since we attribute
our success in selling PCs to the pricing technique we employ),
we conducted a post hoc analysis of a game from the ﬁnal. In
order to reduce the complexity of this analysis, we consider just
the top three performing agents within this game (i.e. in this case
SouthamptonSCM, TacTex-05 and Mertacor (who also happen to
be the top 3 agents in the overall competition)). Now, an essential
factor in the performance of the trading agent is the ability to re-
spond to customer RFQs with competitive offer prices. Thus, we
analyse the game data and we consider just those RFQs for which
all three of the above agents responded with offers. We then con-
sider which of the three agents actually won these orders (noting
that the order is always assigned to the agent that offers the lowest
price). In ﬁgure 4 we show the resulting order quantities (expressed
as factory production cycles averaged over all products), that were
won by each of the three agents. Signiﬁcantly, the Southampton-
SCM agent wins a far larger proportion of the orders than the other
two agents. This is consistent with the overall game analysis, where
the orders these three agents delivered in the game are: 7331 for
SouthamponSCM, 6742 for TacTex-05, and 5588 for Mertacor.
Now, there is little advantage to win these orders, if the offer
price was excessively low. Thus, in ﬁgure 5, we compare the av-
erage offer prices for those orders that were won by each of the
three agents. Speciﬁcally, in ﬁgure 5a we show the average offer
prices of the orders that were actually won by SouthamptonSCM,
in ﬁgure 5b those won by TacTex-05, and in ﬁgure 5c those won
by Mertacor. In each case, as expected, we see that the agent that
won the orders actually submitted offers with the lowest average
price. However, despite winning the majority of the orders, the
prices offered by SouthamptonSCM were not signiﬁcantly lower
than those of the other agents. Indeed, the opposite is true. The
margin by which SouthamptonSCM undercut the other agents is
actually smaller than the margin with which the other agents un-
dercut SouthamptonSCM. For example, in this game, on average
SouthamptonSCMundercutMertacor’spricesby3.0%andTaxTex-
05’s prices by 4.1%. Conversely, on average, TacTex-05 under-
cut SouthamptonSCM’s prices by 6.5% and Mertacor undercut the
prices of SouthamptonSCM by 5.6%.
Thus, the selling strategy of our agent is able to accurately pre-
dict the market price of the ﬁnished products, and is able to under-
cut the competing agents by a small margin. In so doing, our agent
wins a greater proportion of the orders than the other agents, but
7TacTex-05 is believed to have won by learning between games,
and improving its buying strategy over the course of the ﬁnal.
8In order to analyse a representative game, we select randomly
from those games in the ﬁnal that did not experience particurly low
customer demand where all players ended the game year in debt.
As such, we choose the ﬁrst game of the ﬁnal on server tac4 (i.e.
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Figure 5: Daily offer prices for orders won by (a) SouthamptonSCM, (b) TaxTex-05 and (c) Mertacor in game tac4-4253.
does not unnecessarily reduce the price of its offers. Since the ul-
timate proﬁtability of the agent depends on both the price and the
quantity, SouthamptonSCM thus has the highest revenue.
3.2.2 Analysing the Buying Strategy
To investigate the effectiveness of its mixed procurement strategy,
we compare, on a daily basis, the component ordering policies
adopted by the three top performing agents (i.e. SouthamptonSCM,
TacTex-05 and Mertacor). Now, in order to make this comparison,
we can not average over all components as we did in the previous
section. The large range in the base price of the components makes
such averages meaningless. Thus, we select one component for this
comparison, and here we use the IMD 2GHz CPU, since this is not
the most expensive component (the higher performing 5GHz CPU
has a higher base price), and yet, it largely determines the cost of
the ﬁnished product PC. Whilst space does not allow us to present
all the results, we note that the qualitative results that we present
are representative for all the other components.
Now, in ﬁgure 6a, we show the daily average unit cost of the
CPUs that were procured by each of the agents. As can be seen,
SouthamptonSCM paid a similar price to TacTex-05 in the ﬁrst
half of the game. However, after that, SouthamptonSCM procures
components at a much cheaper price. In ﬁgure 6b, we show the
cumulative quantity of CPUs that were procured by each of the
agents. Now, in this game, the demand for the IMD 2GHz CPU
increased in the second half of the game, and thus we observe that
all three agents purchase CPUs at a greater rate in the second half
of the game (i.e. the gradient of the cumulative plot increases). In-
deed, SouthamptonSCM and TacTex-05 end up having obtained an
identical quantity of CPU, with Mertacor buying signiﬁcantly less.
However, since, on average, SouthamptonSCM is able to procure
these CPUs at a lower price, when we compare the cumulative cost
of this procurement, as shown in ﬁgure 6c, we see that Southamp-
tonSCM has paid less for these CPUs in total than TecTex-05 al-
though they both have obtained identical quantity of CPU.9
We can see the reason for this difference in procurement costs by
considering the lead time of these component orders. Thus, ﬁgures
6d, 6e and 6f, show a histogram of the lead time of component
orders that arrive during each simulation day (in this ﬁgure larger
orders are shown with darker shading). In ﬁgure 6d, we can see the
9The difference in costs in ﬁgure 6 is small, but reﬂects the com-
petition’s competitive nature (note that 6b and 6c are cumulative
plots). The difference represents a 6−7% saving in material costs,
whilst the difference in overall margin between SouthamptonSCM
and TacTex-05 was only 1%.
result of the mixed procurement strategy that SouthamptonSCM
adopts. Here, it is clear that each case sees a combination of orders
that were placed with a long lead time (up to to 120 days during
the second half of the game) and a short lead time of 5-20 days
(corresponding to the near and far future procurement strategies).
Note that TacTex-05 uses a predominantly short lead time strategy,
whilst Mertacor uses a long lead time strategy.
Thus, during the ﬁrst half of the game, orders with a short lead
time result in procurement at a low cost. Here we see that TaxTec-
05 procures components at less cost than Mertacor. However, in
the second half of the game, the opposite is true and orders with a
short lead time are more expensive. Here in this half of the game,
SouthamptonSCM procures components at less cost than Mertacor.
However, overall, the mixed procurement strategy of Southampton-
SCM allows it to achieve the best result in both halves of the game;
in the ﬁrst half it achieves similar low prices to TacTex-05, whilst in
the second half it achieves prices signiﬁcantly lower than both the
other agents. Thus, we believe that the mixed procurement strat-
egy incorporating both long and short lead times with market price
tracking, enables SouthamptonSCM to adapt to the behaviour of
the competing agents and buy components at a cheap price.
3.3 Controlled Experiments
To evaluate the performance of our agent in a more systematic fash-
ion than is possible within the actual competition, we ran a series of
controlled experiments. In previous work we have already analysed
our pricing model through controlled experiments and showed that
the way SouthamptonSCM sets its offering prices is signiﬁcantly
better than the benchmark strategies we considered [3]. Thus, here
we focus on evaluating the buying strategy.
As mentioned earlier, we attribute the success of our agent to
the mixed procurement strategy that it uses to purchase compo-
nents at minimum cost. Thus, here we analyse how the buying be-
haviour works when compared to two other common alternatives.
These two strategies are identical to SouthamptonSCM, except for
the method they use to procure components (i.e. the way in which
they schedule factory production and offer ﬁnished products to the
customers is unchanged). The three types of agents we use are:
• Mixed agent (MIX-agent). This agent uses our mixed pro-
curement strategy (described in Section 2.2). In this case, the
daily minimum need for CPU in the far future is set to 30 and
the corresponding value for other components, is set to 60.
• Long-term planning agent (LTP-agent). Compared with
the mixed strategy, the LTP-agent still uses one RFQ each0 40 80 120 160 200
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Figure 6: Comparison of component order prices, quantity and daily lead times for IMD 2GHz CPU orders in game tac4-4253.
day for far future procurement, but the quantity that is re-
quested is greater. Thus this agent attempts to guarantee that
it can obtain the components cheaply (by ordering with long
lead times), but runs the risk that some components may ul-
timately turn out to be unusable (due to a downturn in cus-
tomer demand). Speciﬁcally, the minimum need for CPU in
the far future is set to 60 and the corresponding value for
other components, is set to 120.
• Short-term planning agent (STP-agent). This agent does
notbuyanycomponentsforthefarfuture, andthus, onlyuses
the near future procurement strategy. This strategy is able to
predict and adapt to changes in customer demand. However,
it runs the risk of paying a high price for some components
when the supplier has little spare capacity.
Besides these three kinds of agents, the other competing par-
ticipants within the game are the dummy agents provided by the
organisers. These use a na¨ ıve build-to-order strategy that procures
components with a short lead time (typically several days). Thus
this agent risks paying high component prices, particularly so since
it also sets the reserve price of RFQs that it submits to 0, and thus,
to maintain its reputation, it may have to accept high offer prices.
Given this background, ﬁve groups of experiments were con-
ducted to examine the performance of each kind of agent in various
situations. The number of MIX-agent, LTP-agent and STP-agent
were: in setting A (1, 1, 1), in setting B (1, 2, 1), in setting C (1, 1,
2), in setting D (1, 1, 3), and in setting E (1, 3, 1). In each case, the
remaining agents are the dummy agent provided by the organiser.
The average revenue of each kind of agent in each experiment is
then plotted (see ﬁgure 7).
Now, in ﬁgure 7a, the results for setting A, B and E are pre-
sented.10 Here from A to B to E, we increase the number of LTP-
agents and decrease the number of dummy agents. In setting A,
MIX- and LTP-agents perform signiﬁcantly better than the STP-
agent,11 but we cannot differentiate statistically which is better be-
tween MIX- and LTP-agents. In setting B, we cannot differentiate
statistically which agent is better among these three type of agents.
In setting E, the STP-agent is signiﬁcantly better than the LTP-
agent and MIX-agent is slightly better than the LTP-agent. But we
cannot differentiate statistically which agent is better between STP-
and MIX-agents. From these three experiments, we can conclude
that with an increasing number of LTP-agents, the performance of
the STP- and MIX-agents are getting better, while that of the LTP-
agent is relatively worse. This is because more agents are request-
ing components for the far future, leaving more spare production
capacities for the suppliers in the near future. Thus the component
price for the near future will drop which means the agents that pur-
chase many more components in the near future will beneﬁt from
this price and thus have a low cost.
Similarly, in ﬁgure 7b, the result for settings A, C and D are
presented. Here from A to C to D, we increase the number of STP-
agents and decrease the number of dummy agents. In settings A
10Theperformanceforthedummyagentsarenotshownintheﬁgure
sincetheyaremuchworsethanthesethreetypeofagentsandincor-
porating them would make it difﬁcult to see the difference among
the three.
11In this case and in the statistics below, signiﬁcance is computed
by a Student’s t-test (p < 0.15).1 LTP−agent 2 LTP−agents 3 LTP−agents
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Figure 7: Comparison of performance in various settings.
and C, MIX- and LTP-agents are signiﬁcantly better than the STP-
agent. But we cannot differentiate statistically which agent is better
between MIX- and LTP-agent. This is because there are only two
agents that purchase components for far away which is not likely to
cause the price increase of the components in the far future. But for
the STP-agent, there are some dummy agents which order compo-
nents for a due date in the next several days, thus more competition
in the near future leads to an the increase in the component price
and higher overall procurement costs. In setting D, we obtain the
same result as in setting C, but with a much smaller p value of
the Student’s t-test. This means the performance of STP-agents are
actually getting worse when there are more agents like itself. How-
ever, in all the cases we investigated, the MIX-agent is the most
stable one as it performs consistently in the presence of various
numbers of STP- and LTP-agents. Overall, it obtains the highest
average performance (17.82) and the lowest variance (11.68).
Moreover, as more agents use the same broad strategy of sens-
ing the market and ordering intelligently for the near and far future,
the performance of all the agents are negatively affected, (i.e., the
performance of all the agents is getting worse from experiment A
through B to E, and from A through C to D). This happens because
as the agents within the game become increasingly homogeneous,
there is greater competition for components at a given time (be-
cause there are several agents ordering components for broadly the
same due date for the far future), and thus the suppliers have less
spare capacity, and component costs increase.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a number of insights into building agents for
supply chain management applications. Speciﬁcally, it details the
design, implementation and evaluation of SouthamptonSCM; an
agent that successfully participated in the 2005 TAC SCM. This
agent employs fuzzy reasoning to determine how to set prices and
uses a mixed component procurement strategy that balances long
and short term orders. Through analysing an actual competition
gamefromthe2005ﬁnalwefoundthatthisstrategyenablesSouthamp-
tonSCM to buy more components at lower prices than the other
most successful agents in the game. In a series of controlled exper-
iment, where we varied the number of short-term and long-term-
planning agents in the game, we found that the mixed procurement
strategy was the most stable in all the cases that we considered.
Now, as well as being successful with the TAC SCM competi-
tion, several aspects of our agent design and strategy are applicable
in a wider context. Firstly, the general structure of the component
agent is to employ a mixed strategy where orders in the far fu-
ture cover the minimum baseline quantities needed in low demand
markets, whilst orders in the near future handle current changing
demand. This mixture of baseline and opportunistic purchasing be-
haviour is a common strategy in this domain and the technology
we develop for achieving this can be readily transferred. Second,
we believe our pricing model technology will also be useful in real
SCM applications where just undercutting competitors’ prices can
signiﬁcantly improve proﬁtability. Speciﬁcally, to apply our model
in other domains, the designers of the rule base would need to adapt
the fuzzy rules to reﬂect the factors that are most relevant. Now we
believe that customer demand and inventory level are highly likely
to be critical factors for almost all cases and thus these rules can
remain unaltered. By using different rule bases, different factors
can easily be incorporated (as we did here, in order to handle the
additional need to reduce inventory towards the end of the game).
Our future work in this area focuses on the component agent. We
would like to improve it so that it can adapt the quantity for far fu-
ture and near future procurement automatically between the rounds
ofthegamesaccordingtotheprocurementbehavioursemployedby
the opponents. This can be achieved based on our controlled exper-
iment results, where if there are more LTP-agents in the game, the
agent will adapt its behaviour to the direction of STP-agent. Sim-
ilarly, if there are more STP-agents, the best response is to change
thebuyingbehaviourtothedirectionoftheLTP-agent. Thisknowl-
edge of opponnets’ behaviour can be obtained from the game his-
tory and thus this adaptation can be used in repeated games within
the same participants.
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